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I. INTRODUCTION
The regulatory agencies of seven different countries and regions are
currently investigating an alleged conspiracy by sixteen major international
banks to manipulate the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) during a
period of at least two years, coinciding with the decline of the world
economy in 2007–2008.1 LIBOR began in 1986 as a tool for banks to use in
setting a common interest rate for loans that the banks issued jointly, but it
grew to become the “world’s most important number.”2 Today, around the
world, financial institutions, investment markets, mortgage companies, and
private investment funds use LIBOR as the reference point for determining
interest rates.3 In this way, LIBOR impacts “trillions of dollars in financial
instruments worldwide.”4 Around the world, regulators, private entities, and
other government institutions accused the sixteen banks on the LIBOR board
of submitting false information to the entity that sets LIBOR in order to
manipulate the rate.5 The alleged purpose of this manipulation was two-fold:
(1) to generate higher returns on bank investments and financial tools and (2)
to hide the growing riskiness of the banks’ debts, and in turn financial
distress, as the world economy began to crumble.6 The impact of this
conspiracy is international in scope, affecting the profits earned by financial
institutions, investors, pension funds, and national, state, and local
governments.
While the regulatory agencies of many countries are now investigating
the impact of this conspiracy within their borders, the responsibility for
1
Consol. Amended Complaint for Mayor and City Council of Balt. at 3, In re LIBORBased Financial Instruments Antitrust Litigation (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 1:11-md-2262-NRB),
2012 WL 1522306 [hereinafter Consol. Amended Complaint Balt.]. In 2011, a series of classaction lawsuits was filed in the United States against the sixteen banks that make up the
LIBOR rate-setting board. The lawsuits initially filed make up a series of complaints, but all
of which allege injuries from the alleged conspiracy to set LIBOR below the market rate.
These complaints describe much of the background of the conspiracy, as well as the current
regulatory efforts to control it. The lawsuits are ongoing.
2
David Enrich & Max Colchester, Before Scandal, Clash Over Control of LIBOR, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 11, 2012, at A1 (describing the struggle by the British Bankers’ Association
(BBA) to ensure the integrity of LIBOR in the wake of evidence of manipulation by BBA
members, increasing pressure from regulators from abroad, and the early hands-off approach
taken by the Bank of England).
3
Consol. Amended Complaint Balt., supra note 1, at 2.
4
Id.
5
Id. at 2–3.
6
Id. at 2; Peter J. Henning, In UBS Convictions, Parallels to the LIBOR Investigation,
DEALBOOK, Sept. 4, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 18820693.
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regulating the LIBOR setting process fell on the U.K., as LIBOR is set daily
by the British Bankers’ Association.7 This Note will examine international
pressures on the U.K. to regulate LIBOR prior to the uncovering of the
conspiracy to manipulate the rate. Additionally, the Note will lay out the
U.K.’s proposed solutions to the crisis through an examination of the
Wheatley Review of LIBOR, which lays out a blueprint for LIBOR reform.8
This Note will then examine existing international banking regulatory
mechanisms and how the Wheatley Review’s proposed solutions may fit into
these existing structures. Finally, this Note will present future issues that
must be addressed in order to fill the growing need for stronger international
mechanisms for banking regulation as banking continues to expand to global
markets. Of particular importance is how to address the need for an
international enforcement mechanism in the banking industry.
II. BACKGROUND: LIBOR
First, to understand the need for an international response to the LIBOR
scandal, one must understand the vital role that LIBOR plays in international
financial markets. Often called the “world’s most important number,”
LIBOR is the rate against which the interest rates for trillions of dollars of
financial instruments around the world are set.9
LIBOR is an invention of the British Bankers’ Association (BBA),10 a
trade association for the United Kingdom’s (UK) banking and financial
industry. The BBA represents more than 170 banks from 180 countries.11
The BBA’s self-described role is “to promote a legislative and regulatory
system for banking and financial services—in the UK, Europe and
internationally—which takes account of [BBA] members’ needs and
concerns.”12 While on the one hand, the BBA is essentially a lobbying group
on behalf of its members,13 it also oversaw the setting of LIBOR for the past

7

Consol. Amended Complaint Balt., supra note 1, at 2.
Her Majesty’s Treasury, The Wheatley Review of LIBOR: Final Report (2012), available
at http://cdn.hm-treasury.gov.uk/wheatley_review_libor_finalreport_280912.pdf [hereinafter
The Wheatley Review].
9
Enrich & Colchester, supra note 2; Consol. Amended Complaint Balt., supra note 1, at 2.
10
Enrich & Colchester, supra note 2; About Us, BRITISH BANKERS’ ASS’N, http://www.bba.
org.uk/about-us (last visited Oct. 12, 2012) [hereinafter BBA About Us].
11
Enrich & Colchester, supra note 2.
12
BBA About Us, supra note 10.
13
Id.
8
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thirty years.14 So, how did what started out as a trade association and
advocacy center for the U.K. banking industry come to oversee the world’s
most important number?
A. The History of LIBOR: Growth of LIBOR to the World’s Most Important
Number
In short, it happened by accident. LIBOR was never intended to be such
an integral part of the world market.15 The BBA created LIBOR in the 1980s
as a response to the desire of members to create an easier way to set
collective interest rates for a new type of financial product, Forward Rate
Agreements. Forward Rate Agreements were unique in that they required
parties to agree to the interest rates underlying the products at the outset.16
The BBA member banks asked the BBA to facilitate these agreements by
developing a benchmark that could be used to set these interest rates.17
Thus, in 1984 the BBA standard for Interest Settlement rates
(BBAIRS)—LIBOR’s predecessor—was born.18 From 1985 to 1986 the use
of the BBAIRS became standard practice by banks in setting the rates for
Forward Swap Agreements and other types of financial tools. In 1986, the
BBA published LIBOR for the first time, offered in three different
currencies: the U.S. Dollar, the Japanese Yen, and the British Pound.
LIBOR had begun.19
B. LIBOR Explained: LIBOR’s Impact on the Global Economic Marketplace
In essence, LIBOR is the interest rate at which BBA member banks
believe they would be able to borrow money on the global market.20 The
rate is set in ten different currencies daily, based on the reports of member
14

Enrich & Colchester, supra note 2. In this article, the authors address the apparent
growing tension between the BBA’s role as a trade association and its position as the overseer
(and for all intents and purposes the regulator) of LIBOR. Additionally, the authors describe
the ongoing conversations between the BBA and regulators, such as the Bank of England and
the Federal Reserve Board of New York.
15
Id.
16
BBALIBOR Explained: Historical Perspective, BBALIBOR, http://www.bbalibor.com/
explained/historical-perspective.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
BBALIBOR Explained: The Basics, BRITISH BANKERS’ ASS’N, http://www.bbalibor.com/
bbalibor-explained/the-basics [hereinafter BBALIBOR Basics].
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banks about their perceived individual ability to borrow funds on the global
market.21 In the same way that consumer credit card rates indicate the
riskiness of lending to that particular borrower, the individual bank’s
reported rate to LIBOR is supposed to reveal how risky a loan to a BBA
member bank is at the time of reporting, because the rate should indicate on
how much interest another bank would charge the member to borrow
money.22 Just as a credit card company charges a higher interest rate to a
consumer with a low credit score based on the risk that the company will not
be repaid, a lending bank will charge a higher interest rate on a loan to
another bank if the lending bank perceives that the bank receiving the loan
may not be able to pay that loan back.
LIBOR is calculated daily based on submissions by a group of BBA
member banks that sit on the LIBOR panel for each of the ten different
currencies.23 For example, sixteen different banks made up the board for the
U.S. Dollar LIBOR rate during the mid-to-late 2000s.24 Some of the banks
overlap currencies; for example nine of the sixteen banks that made up the
U.S. Dollar LIBOR panel during the late mid-to-late 2000s also “served on
the Japanese Yen, Swiss Franc, and Euro LIBOR panels.”25 The banks that
sit on LIBOR panels call into the BBA daily to give a submission, based on
the following question: “[A]T WHAT RATE COULD YOU BORROW FUNDS, WERE
YOU TO DO SO BY ASKING FOR AND THEN ACCEPTING INTER-BANK OFFERS IN A
26
REASONABLE MARKET SIZE JUST PRIOR TO 11 AM?.”
The banks’ submissions do not need to be based on actual borrowing
rates, as every bank will not attempt to borrow funds daily.27 Instead, a bank
might calculate its perceived borrowing rate based on its credit and liquidity
risk profile.28 The bank then can construct a curve to predict the correct rate
for currencies or maturities in which it has not been actively borrowing on
any particular day.29 Once each bank on a LIBOR panel makes its daily
submissions, the BBA then takes an average of the submissions to set
LIBOR for each currency.30
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Id.; Consol. Amended Complaint Balt., supra note 1, at 8.
BBALIBOR Basics, supra note 20; Consol. Amended Complaint Balt., supra note 1, at 9.
Consol. Amended Complaint Balt., supra note 1, at 9.
Id. at 8.
Id.
BBALIBOR Basics, supra note 20.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Consol. Amended Complaint for Balt., supra note 1, at 9.
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The average is not taken from all submissions, however. BBA attempts
to eliminate outliers in the submission pool by dropping the highest 25% and
the lowest 25% of submissions each day.31 The rate is then published by
Thomson Reuters, and reported along with the submissions of the individual
banks on which the BBA based its calculation.32 Banks are not allowed to
see other banks’ submissions until after the rate is published.33
C. The World’s Most Important Number: The Impact of LIBOR on Global
Financial Markets
Once used only to set the rates for financial instruments between banks,
LIBOR rates now impact almost every industry, consumer, and financial tool
in the global market.34 LIBOR is the benchmark for setting short-term
interest rates globally.35 When most types of commercial financial contracts
are entered into around the world, LIBOR determines the interest rate,
whether for a sophisticated derivatives contract, a commercial loan for a
small business, a family’s mortgage, or a credit card.36 It is astonishing that
all of these financial contracts are based on a rate that is entirely
unregulated.37
D. LIBOR in Scandal: The Conspiracy to Set the LIBOR Rate and the
Impact on Global Economic Markets
In the last few years, the banks that make up the LIBOR panel have been
accused of colluding to artificially suppress the LIBOR rate by international
regulatory agencies and private parties alike.38 Seven countries and political
entities, including the United States, Switzerland, Japan, the United
Kingdom, Canada, the European Union, and Singapore, instituted civil and
criminal investigations into the alleged manipulation.39 In 2011 the first
lawsuits against the sixteen banks that made up the U.S. Dollar LIBOR board
were filed, alleging, among other claims, antitrust violations marked by a
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Id.
Id.
BBALIBOR Basics, supra note 20.
Id.; Enrich & Colchester, supra note 2.
BBALIBOR Basics, supra note 20.
Enrich & Colchester, supra note 2.
Id.
Consol. Amended Complaint Balt., supra note 1, at 9.
Id. at 3.
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conspiracy to set the LIBOR rate.40 And by the spring of 2012, the U.S. and
U.K. regulators had uncovered evidence that the BBA member banks that
make up the LIBOR panels manipulated the LIBOR rate.41
These accusations stem from evidence that the LIBOR rate did not match
up to other information regarding the health of the banks and the overall
economy.42 Banks on the LIBOR panel could potentially benefit from the
artificial suppression of LIBOR in two ways.43 First, by underreporting their
LIBOR submission, a bank could cover its precarious financial positions and
lower the level of risk associated with that bank.44 This picture of financial
health became particularly important in the wake of the 2007 financial crisis,
when financial markets started becoming particularly wary of increasing
investment risk.45 A higher LIBOR submission by any bank indicated more
need of cash to cover poorly-performing investments and, in turn, a higher
risk for anyone lending to that bank.46
Second, by lowering the LIBOR rate, a bank could pay lower interest
rates on any of the LIBOR-based financial instruments that bank sold to
investors.47 As discussed above, LIBOR is the global standard for all shortterm interest rates, so if a bank sells a security to a pension fund, for
example, when the LIBOR rate goes up so does the rate of return on that
investment. This relationship between the rate of return and LIBOR means
that the bank has to pay a higher rate of return to the pension fund and, as a
result, loses money. For example, in 2009 JPMorgan Chase reported that if
interest rates increased by 1%, the bank would lose over $500 million.48
Therefore, by artificially suppressing rates, the banks on the LIBOR panel
could both conceal the apparent riskiness of their current financial status and
40
Id. at 2; Amended Consol. Class Action Complaint for Exchange-based Plaintiffs, In re
LIBOR-Based Financial Instruments Antitrust Litigation (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 2262, 11 Civ.
2613.), 2012 WL 1522305, at 1.
41
Enrich & Colchester, supra note 2.
42
Consol. Amended Complaint Balt., supra note 1, at 10–15 (describing the work of
independent consultants hired in anticipation of litigation to determine whether the LIBOR
rate appeared to be artificially suppressed based on other financial data, as well as discussing a
variety of news articles describing concerns about the seemingly low LIBOR rates).
43
Id. at 9 (describing the alleged financial incentives of LIBOR member banks to keep
LIBOR rates low generally and particularly to suppress the LIBOR rate during the financial
crisis of 2007–2008).
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 10.
47
Id.
48
Id.
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also keep from having to pay out large sums in interest owed to investors on
their products.49
From a plaintiff’s perspective, artificial suppression causes an owner of
any product with an interest rate set to LIBOR to lose money owed to the
owner during the period of suppression.50 Additionally, anyone buying an
investment with a risk calculation based on LIBOR is actually exposed to
greater risk than the reported LIBOR rate indicated.51 The lawsuits against
the banks stem from these types of alleged losses.52
E. Who was Minding the Store? The Historic Regulation of LIBOR in the
U.K.
No regulatory agency oversees the setting of LIBOR by the BBA, which
is a private entity.53 In fact, the administration of and submission to LIBOR
currently fall under no statutory authority at all.54 Therefore the ongoing
regulatory investigations by countries are proceeding only by connecting
LIBOR to already regulated banking activities. However, as the rate is set in
London by a British organization the main purview for overseeing the
regulation of the group falls either with the Bank of England, the U.K.’s
Central Bank (akin in its role to the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank), H.M.
Treasury (similar to the U.S. Treasury Department), or the Financial Services
Authority (a nongovernmental entity established to oversee banking in the
U.K.).55 In 2007, the Bank of England held a meeting where executives of
several banks indicated that they were concerned that LIBOR seemed

49

Id.
Id. at 2–3 (describing the specific alleged injuries suffered by the plaintiffs here, as well
as the general role that LIBOR plays in investments, and the harm that necessarily stems from
the LIBOR rate being set artificially low).
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 8.
54
The Wheatley Review, supra note 8, at 11 (describing the need to move LIBOR under the
statutory regulatory authority of a U.K. regulatory body).
55
About the Bank: Core Purposes, BANK OF ENGLAND, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/abo
ut/Pages/corepurposes/default.aspx; Memorandum of Understanding between HM Treasury, the
Bank of England and the Financial Services Authority, BANK OF ENGLAND, http://www.bankof
england.co.uk/financialstability/Documents/mou.pdf [hereinafter UK Regulatory Body MOU]
(describing the delineation of duties and the relationship between the key U.K. banking
regulatory institutions: HM Treasury, the Bank of England, and the FSA); Who are we?,
FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/about/who [hereinafter FSA Who].
50
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artificially low.56 Concerns were expressed that perhaps LIBOR contributor
banks were underreporting borrowing rates in an attempt to stave off
concerns about shaky financial conditions.57 In spite of these concerns,
however, the Bank of England declined to take action at the time, given that
the BBA assured the group that the current rate-setting process was sufficient
to prevent any such problems.58
But the concerns about potential underreporting did not go away. In 2008
The Wall Street Journal began reporting about the apparent problems with
LIBOR calculation, setting off a series of articles highlighting the red flags
surrounding the rate’s integrity.59 After the first article was printed, the BBA
immediately sent a memo to all the banks as a reminder to make honest
submissions about its rates.60 Additionally, the BBA contacted the Bank of
England to discuss the regulator engaging in a process, along with the U.S.
Federal Reserve, to develop a framework for the regulators to provide
oversight to LIBOR.61 However the Bank of England declined to participate,
and eventually the Federal Reserve backed out as well.62 Neither entity
wanted to be seen as officially endorsing the rate or the BBA’s review of the
rate.63 These decisions again left LIBOR in the hands of the BBA, which
oversees LIBOR through a separate legal entity, BBA LIBOR Ltd.64
The impact that LIBOR has on financial markets is incalculable, and the
fact that the U.K. regulators had no direct oversight authority may be partly
responsible for creating an opportunity for a conspiracy to thrive. The
LIBOR scandal revealed just how much one country’s regulatory institutions
can impact the entire world market. In order to solve this problem, each
country cannot be left to the whim of the government’s political attitudes

56

Enrich & Colchester, supra note 2.
Id.
58
Id.
59
A long series of articles was released in the Wall Street Journal beginning in 2008
describing the building concerns over LIBOR, tracking the investigations by international
regulatory bodies, and examining private litigation resulting from the conspiracy. For a small
sampling, see Carrick Mollenkamp, Bankers Cast Doubt on Key Rate Amid Crisis, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 16, 2008; Carrick Mollenkamp, LIBOR Surges after Scrutiny Does, Too, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 18, 2008; Carrick Mollenkamp, LIBOR’s Accuracy Becomes Issue Again, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 24, 2008.
60
Enrich & Colchester, supra note 2.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
BBALIBOR Basics, supra note 20; Enrich & Colchester, supra note 2.
57
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toward regulation at a given time or in a given market; instead, a common
solution must be developed.
Over the last several months, regulators around the world have been
meeting to discuss the future of LIBOR, and the U.K. Government has
released “The Wheatley Review,” a ten-point plan for re-tooling LIBOR in
the wake of the rate-setting conspiracy.65 This Note explores the Wheatley
Review’s regulatory solutions and compares those solutions to international
responses to past crises and the effectiveness of current international banking
regulatory bodies. Additionally, this Note explores the tension of a proposed
national regulatory solution in the wake of a problem with vast international
impacts. Finally, this Note proposes finding an international solution that
can address the problems raised by the LIBOR conspiracy.
III. NATIONAL REGULATORY RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL BANKING
CRISES: THE TENSIONS IN ENFORCING BANKING REGULATION IN A GLOBAL
ECONOMIC MARKET
For more than twenty years, national regulatory bodies of the banking
industry have acknowledged the need for international cooperation to
regulate financial instruments, particularly derivatives.66 There already exist
several international regulatory bodies, such as the Bank for International
Settlements’ Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee)
and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), that
issue guidelines developed cooperatively with their different memberships,
which are then implemented by the national regulatory institutions that
comprise those bodies.67 These committees do not have any independent
regulatory or enforcement power but instead use international cooperation
among national regulators to develop guidelines for the global banking

65

Her Majesty’s Treasury, Independent Review into Libor Published, Sept. 28, 2012, at
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/wheatley_review_pn_280912.htm.
66
Thomas C. Singher, Regulating Derivatives: Does Transnational Regulatory Cooperation
Offer a Viable Alternative to Congressional Action, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1397, 1461–68
(1995).
67
Id. at 1461–63 (describing the role of these bodies in issuing guidelines for the regulation
of derivatives-related risks); About the Basel Committee, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL
SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/about.htm/ [hereinafter About Basel Committee];
IOSCO Historical Background, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS,
http://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section=background [hereinafter IOSCO Historical
Background].
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market, and those guidelines are then implemented and enforced by each
body’s respective members.68
This type of international cooperation, while it provides some level of
international cohesiveness in regulatory policy, still leaves much of the
regulatory policy-setting in banking to national entities. This level of
national autonomy in an increasingly global world leaves open the question
of how national regulators take into account the global impacts of their
regulatory decisions and how regulatory bodies with no jurisdiction over key
global economic measures or entities, such as BBALIBOR, ward off coming
global crises.
First, this section examines the proposed U.K. plan for shifting the
regulatory structure of LIBOR, and the sufficiency of that plan in taking into
account the international impacts of the conspiracy to fix LIBOR. Next, it
examines how current Basel Committee and IOSCO policies and
enforcement mechanisms may come into play in the enforcement and
implementation of such new regulations.
A. Why the Ten-Point Plan? The Underlying Policy Goals of the
Recommendations by the Wheatley Review
In 2009, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) of the U.K. collaborated
with regulators in a number of nations to investigate LIBOR misconduct.69
The FSA is a non-governmental entity in the U.K. empowered by the British
Parliament to regulate and supervise banks in cooperation with Her
Majesty’s (H.M.) Treasury and the Bank of England.70 As a result of the
investigations, the FSA announced in June 2012 that it would be fining
Barclays Bank £59.5 million for that bank’s role in the 2012 LIBOR ratesetting crisis.71
68
Singher, supra note 66, at 1465; IOSCO Historical Background, supra note 67; About
Basel Committee, supra note 67.
69
The Wheatley Review, supra note 8, at 5 (describing how the Wheatley Review provided
an overview of the report).
70
FSA Who, supra note 55; UK Regulatory Body MOU, supra note 55.
71
FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, BARCLAYS FINED £59.5 MILLION FOR SIGNIFICANT
FAILINGS IN RELATION TO LIBOR AND EURIBOR, June 27, 2012, FSA/PN/070/2012,
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/pr/2012/070.shtml [hereinafter
FSA Barclays Findings] (reproducing the final report of the FSA’s findings that Barclays’s
had engaged in continuous misconduct in regards to LIBOR including: making submissions
that unlawfully took into account requests from the bank’s interest rate derivatives traders in
order to benefit bank trading positions; seeking to influence submissions of other banks
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Following that announcement, the British government called on Martin
Wheatley to conduct a review of the setting and usage of LIBOR.72
Wheatley is the current director of the FSA, and also is the CEO designate of
a new U.K. regulatory body to be established within the next year, the
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).73 The purpose of the Wheatley Review
was to look not at the specific allegations regarding any particular bank’s or
individual’s attempts to manipulate LIBOR;74 instead the review was
intended to examine LIBOR for the purpose of making recommendations for
reform to the British Government, the BBA, banks, and other regulatory
bodies.75 The Report examines opportunities to regulate and reform LIBOR
itself, but it also examines whether an alternative benchmark should replace
LIBOR and makes recommendations about the future of LIBOR and other
potential interest rate setting benchmarks.76 Ultimately, the Wheatley
Review lays out a ten-point plan for the reformation of LIBOR without any
recommendation to actually end the use of the benchmark.77
Three conclusions shape the foundation of this ten-point plan.78 First, the
Wheatley Review concluded that, at least in the short term, rather than
replacing LIBOR with an alternate benchmark, efforts should focus on
reforming it.79 One reason for this conclusion is the interest in limiting risk
and uncertainty in an already shaky global economy.80 The Wheatley
Review argues that the transition to a new benchmark rate would impose too
high a risk on the global financial market.81 The Wheatley Review examines
not only how the shift might create financial instability as the markets try to
understand the new rate, but also how the shift could result in large-scale
litigation as parties who hold contracts referencing LIBOR attempt to

involved in setting LIBOR; and reducing the bank’s own LIBOR submissions in order to
avoid negative media publicity during the financial crisis).
72
The Wheatley Review, supra note 8, at 5.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 1, 5–6.
77
Id. at 8–9.
78
Id. at 7.
79
Id.
80
Id. (describing the vast number of contracts impacted by LIBOR, amounting to at least
$300 trillion, as the main reason and concluding that opening those contracts up to litigation
by replacing LIBOR would be too disruptive and costly, given that LIBOR has not been
irreparably damaged).
81
Id.
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renegotiate the terms.82 Additionally, while some might question whether
LIBOR can really ever be reformed given the serious credibility issues the
benchmark suffered after the rate-setting crisis, the Wheatley Review points
out that the evidence does not bear out these concerns, considering that there
has been “no noticeable decline in the use of LIBOR by market
participants.”83 The Review goes on to point out that most market
participants consulted on the issue argued for the use of some form of
LIBOR rather than an alternative mechanism.84 However, the question
remains whether the choice to merely reform rather than replace LIBOR is a
feasible long-term solution.85 The Wheatley Review points out that an
internationally coordinated effort to analyze potential alternative benchmarks
is required before any major change is imposed.86
Second, the Wheatley Review concluded that submissions must be
verifiable based on transaction data, rather than simply based on each bank’s
own estimate of the rate at which it could borrow on any given day.87 If a
bank’s submission is verified with data about the bank’s transactions, rather
than simply being taken at face value, the rate-setting process is less
susceptible to manipulation.88 These strict procedures have both internal
and external regulatory components and contain both intermediate measures
that allow for immediate implementation as well as longer-term mechanisms
to prevent future scandals.89
Finally, the Wheatley Review determined that the role of setting LIBOR
should remain in the hands of the market participants, i.e., the financial
institutions, rather than being set by the government.90 The Wheatley
Review states that the setting of a global benchmark such as LIBOR is most
appropriately done by a private entity that engages market participants in the
development of the tool itself.91 The Review highlights two reasons for
82

Id.
Id.
84
Id.
85
Evan Weinberger, Proposed Libor Fixes May Open Door to New Benchmark, LAW 360,
Sept. 28, 2012, http://www.law360.com/banking/articles/382575/proposed-libor-fixes-may-op
en-door-to-new-benchmark.
86
The Wheatley Review, supra note 8, at 7.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 31–33 (describing the proposed submission process, including the types of data that
would be acceptable to use to form submissions and the internal and external process for
verifying those submissions).
90
Id. at 7.
91
Id.
83
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keeping the LIBOR rate-setting process in the hands of private participants.
First, it points to the role that market participants play in setting other
benchmarks, even though none of those benchmarks are as widely used as
LIBOR. Second, it points to the expertise that market participants have
about which benchmark to use for a particular type of financial contract.92
However, the authors of the Review also designate a new external regulatory
role over LIBOR submissions, stating that the role of such external bodies is
to ensure that the benchmark is reliable and verifiable and maintains its
integrity.93
The Wheatley Review’s Ten-Point Plan stems entirely from these three
conclusions and offers an implementation process for the U.K. going
forward.94 It presents specific recommendations, which going forward will
represent the U.K.’s entire regulatory response to the LIBOR rate-setting
The BBA, in cooperation with U.K. regulators, began
scandal.95
implementing many of these recommendations in 2013.96 LIBOR was sold
to NYSE Euronet, the U.S. company that runs the New York Stock
Exchange, in July of 2013.97 While NYSE Euronet has assured investors that
it will continue to implement LIBOR reforms, LIBOR will no longer be
under the purview of U.K. regulators, and no information is available as to
whether the Wheatley review recommendations will be the regulations
implemented.98
B. The Ten-Point Plan: Recommendations to the U.K. for a National
Response to the LIBOR Rate-Setting Scandal
The Ten-Point Plan has several overarching recommendations focused on
making LIBOR a safer tool for setting worldwide interest rates. The first of
these recommendations is that the administration of and submission to
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LIBOR should be statutorily regulated.99 This recommendation involves
bringing LIBOR under the U.K.’s Financial Services and Markets Act
(FSMA).100 Regulation will include an “Approved Persons regime,” which
will require each bank submitting a LIBOR proposal to designate someone
whose responsibility will be to manage the LIBOR submissions process and
to submit independent audits periodically to regulators.101 Additionally, the
recommendations include making the manipulation or attempted
manipulation of LIBOR a criminal offense in the U.K., particularly given the
likelihood that such manipulation “occur[s] in full awareness of the
potentially serious and wide ranging [sic] impact that manipulation of
LIBOR may have in light of its global use.”102
The recommendations also take on an international regulatory slant, in
that the Wheatley Review recognizes ongoing efforts by the EU and IOSCO
to create general guidelines around benchmarks and acknowledges that the
recommendations for LIBOR perhaps should extend to other financial
benchmarks in the future.103 This Note proposes an addition to this idea, an
examination of how an international body can enforce such guidelines and
hold manipulators of benchmarks responsible at a global level. This is
particularly important considering the ongoing civil and criminal
investigations by regulatory bodies around the world. An international
enforcement mechanism is crucial in the case of LIBOR, given the farreaching consequences of any manipulation of such a rate.
The second recommendation suggests the BBA turn over the
administration of LIBOR to a new body, which would be responsible not
only for compilation and distribution of the rate but also for providing
internal governance and oversight.104 However, the Wheatley Review does
not recommend that the new administrator of LIBOR be a public
institution.105 Instead, the review recommends that LIBOR should remain a
market-led benchmark and should be administered by a private entity.106 The
reasons for this conclusion are grounded on the belief that LIBOR must be
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able to evolve to meet the needs of the market and that a private organization
will have a greater incentive to ensure that flexibility.107
The Wheatley Review also states that other problems could arise if
LIBOR was administered by a public agency. It specifically raises a concern
about establishing a global precedent of transferring other benchmarks to
public entities for administration rather than simply oversight and
regulation.108 Again, here the authors of the Wheatley Review recognize the
important role that LIBOR plays in the global financial market and how
regulation and oversight of LIBOR may impact international regulatory
policy and precedent.
Building upon the transfer of LIBOR from BBA administration, the third
recommendation is that the new administrator of LIBOR conduct ongoing
surveillance to ensure that LIBOR submissions are accurate and statistically
valid.109 First, the review recommends that the BBA delegate the process of
transferring LIBOR to the new administrator to an independent committee
put together by the British government and the FSA.110 This committee will
then be responsible for ensuring that the new administrator reforms the
LIBOR governance structure to increase its credibility.111
While the Wheatley Review allows for some flexibility in establishing the
new governance structure, the review makes clear the purposes of such a
structure, including requiring the new administrator “to analyse [sic] and
scrutinise [sic] submissions from contributing banks.”112 Additionally, the
Review strongly recommends that the structure “include a prominent
decision-making and oversight role conducted by an independent and
powerful committee with the ability to operate autonomously.”113
Additionally, the Wheatley Review recommendations provide for the
administrator to take on some specific roles “in order to ensure that
confidence in the integrity of LIBOR as a benchmark is widely restored.”114
These recommendations are particularly focused on ensuring the integrity
and accuracy of the member banks’ submissions process. Included in these
recommendations are requirements that the administrator ensure that LIBOR
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
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is not reserved only for specific market participants, that the bank
submissions are strictly scrutinized both before and after publication utilizing
statistical analysis, and that a process for accepting banks as members is
clearly developed.115
The next recommendation also encompasses the role of the independent
oversight committee.116 The Wheatley Review particularly recommends
involving the oversight committee in the development of a code of conduct
for contributing banks, the administrator, and the committee itself.117 The
purpose of this oversight committee is to provide an additional layer of
transparency, and to this end the review authors recommend that the
committee’s meetings should be published along with details of elections to
the committee.118 However, the review also recommends that such
membership not include regulators, as the purpose of the committee is to
establish an internal oversight mechanism that works in tandem with the
additional external regulation of LIBOR.119
Most of these recommendations are focused on the establishment of
external LIBOR structures, but questions remain regarding the role that
international players may have in the governance of the new LIBOR
structure. Given that the existing LIBOR board represents banks from
around the world,120 it is also unclear whether the home base of LIBOR
should remain in the U.K. and how the make-up of the membership board
will reflect the global nature of LIBOR, given that the responsibility for
regulation under this new plan will lie solely with the U.K.121

115
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The fourth recommendation in the ten-point plan shifts gears into concern
over the specific rules governing LIBOR.122 This recommendation requires
immediate compliance with the guidelines from the banks making LIBOR
Particularly, immediate compliance is sought on
submissions.123
requirements that banks support their submissions to LIBOR with
transactional data.124 The authors of the Wheatley Review suggest some
intermediate submission guidelines to govern this process while the formal
code of conduct and regulatory guidelines continue to be developed.125
These intermediate guidelines set out the specific types of data that banks
should use to verify their submissions. Because not all banks borrow funds
daily, as every bank does not need to borrow money daily to meet business
needs, the data requirements must be specific to govern submissions not
based on actual borrowing rates for the day.126 Examples of some types of
transactions a bank could use to verify its submission include transactions in
the unsecured inter-bank deposit market or other unsecured deposit markets,
such as certificates of deposit and commercial paper.127
The goal of utilizing these intermediate measures is to introduce muchneeded immediate reforms before the full regulatory recommendations.128
Interestingly, the Wheatley Review notes that these submission guidelines
are modeled on those set forth in a settlement between the Commodities
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and Barclays Bank.129 Again, this
type of transfer of regulatory models across national boundaries reveals the
closely tied global regulatory market into which these new LIBOR
regulations are being introduced.
With recommendation five, the Wheatley Review again focuses on longer
term solutions with the recommendation that the future administrator of
LIBOR set forth a Code of Conduct to “serve as a manual for internal
governance and organisation [sic] of LIBOR submission.”130 Additionally,
this code of conduct should serve as a guide to the FSA regulation of
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LIBOR.131 However, the authors of the Wheatley Review recommend that
industry participants, not the FSA, draft the code.132
The Wheatley Review outlines the code of conduct’s scope to include
information about submission procedures, internal system and control
policies, requirements for submitting banks regarding recording transactional
data, and industry guidelines for assurance and audit.133 Essentially this code
of conduct would operate as a detailed rulebook for both LIBOR contributors
as well as the administrator of LIBOR and the independent review
committee.134
Recommendations six through nine deal with immediate actions to be
taken by the BBA while other recommendations are still in the
implementation phase.135 The sixth recommendation directs the BBA to stop
compiling and publishing LIBOR for any currency for which the trade data is
insufficient to corroborate the submissions.136 At the time of the Wheatley
Review’s publication, LIBOR was published for ten currencies and fifteen
different maturities.137 The authors of the review recommend that where the
volume of transactions for a LIBOR benchmark is low or where another
benchmark or domestic alternative is generally preferred, that currency
should be phased out of the submissions process.138 The purpose of the
phasing out, according to the review, is to ensure that LIBOR submissions
can be verified by supporting transactional data.139
Accordingly, the Wheatley Review recommends that some currencies,
including the Australian Dollar, the Canadian Dollar, the Danish Kroner, the
New Zealand Dollar, and the Swedish Kronor, be phased out after the BBA
creates a plan in consultation with both users and submitters.140 In order to
implement this recommendation, it will be vital that the administrator of
LIBOR reach out to market participants and users of LIBOR in these
131
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currencies to avoid creating large unintended consequences from the phaseout, such as large-scale litigation to redefine outstanding contracts that
reference LIBOR in these currencies.141 Again, the implementation of this
recommendation will require that the administrator and regulator of LIBOR
have a clear understanding of the impact these decisions regarding LIBOR
will have on the global financial market.
The seventh recommendation directs the BBA to cease the daily
publication of the LIBOR submissions and, instead, to shift to publishing
each bank’s submissions every three months.142 This recommendation arises
from a concern that the daily publication of rates, while thought to promote
transparency and accountability for the sake of accuracy of submissions,
actually facilitated the manipulation surrounding the recent LIBOR
scandal.143 As mentioned earlier, the BBA publishes each bank’s individual
submission after the LIBOR rate is set for the day.144 The thinking behind
this publication process s is that the banks, knowing the rates will be
published, are less likely to submit false rates that can be identified by the
public.145 However, in reality, this immediate publication could instead
facilitate manipulation, in that the publication allows banks to estimate the
likely impact of their submission in advance and therefore tamper with that
submission to get the desired result.146 Also, the LIBOR submission by a
particular bank often provides an implicit signal to the public regarding that
bank’s credit-worthiness;147 therefore, daily publication may create an
incentive to a bank to submit a lower rate to uphold this implication.148 The
recommendation of the Wheatley Review is to delay the submission for at
least three months in order to circumvent both of these potential incentives
for manipulation and to retain the transparency and accountability goals of
publication.149
The eighth recommendation in the ten-point plan focuses on broadening
participation in LIBOR, suggesting that banks, even those currently not on
the LIBOR board, should be encouraged to participate as widely as possible
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in the process of compiling the rate.150 The Wheatley Review even suggests
making such participation compulsory through new regulatory reforms if
necessary.151 The Wheatley Review notes that the broader the sample size of
banks submitting to set the LIBOR rate, the more accurate and credible the
rate will become.152 This increase in accuracy and credibility is specifically
derived from the decreasing impact that individual submissions will have on
the published rates and the hope that the rate overall may become more
representative of the actual global market.153 The role of international
regulatory bodies in encouraging broader participation is vital to ensuring
this recommendation meets its actual goal, particularly considering the
importance of LIBOR in the global financial market.154 In the review,
international authorities are asked to engage in encouraging participation
among banks in their jurisdictions.155 The ninth recommendation focuses on
limiting the risk posed by a potential failure of LIBOR to market
participants.156 Again, LIBOR is the rate against which the interest rates on
trillions of dollars of financial instruments around the world are set.157 One
of the fears that the Wheatley Review raises about the idea of scrapping
LIBOR for another benchmark rate is the risk that such a decision would
pose to market participants who used LIBOR as a benchmark for these
The Wheatley Review
trillions of dollars of contract liabilities.158
acknowledges the problems that would result from a failure to publish
LIBOR—even for one day—and states that the current contingency plan for
such a failure in most standard LIBOR-based financial contracts is
unworkable.159 Most contracts referencing LIBOR require an alternate rate
to be calculated by simply replicating, at the participant level, the submission
process.160 Just as the LIBOR submission process involves a set of banks
calling in to report their proposed borrowing rates that day, the contingency
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plan requires the market participant to call a set of reference banks to get
similar quotes for the currency and maturity specified in the contract.161
The reasons this contingency plan is unworkable are three-fold:
1.
2.
3.

The sheer volume of contracts referencing LIBOR
around the world makes the number of contacting
market participants unwieldy;
If LIBOR has failed, then the reference banks, who
are also likely to be the banks submitting to LIBOR,
may not be prepared to provide such quotes; and
Because the use of such contingencies would be so
widespread, differences in individual contract
provisions could lead counterparties to have different
interest rates payable between them.162

“The Wheatley Review recommends that industry bodies that publish
standardized legal documentation in relation to contracts referencing LIBOR,
as well as LIBOR users, . . . develop robust contingency procedures to take
effect in the event of a longer-term disruption to the publication of
LIBOR.”163 However, this recommendation again highlights the on-going
need for international regulatory cooperation. Currently, many of these
industry players who publish such model contracts operate across
international channels.164 For example, the International Swaps and
Derivatives Association, which developed the commonly used ISDA Master
Agreement, has members from over fifty-nine countries.165 In order to get
this standardized contingency plan in place, organizations such as ISDA will
have to come to a cooperative solution trans-nationally on an alternative
benchmark to use if LIBOR is not available.
The final recommendation focuses on international cooperation and is key
to the purposes of this Note.166 The tenth recommendation of the Wheatley
Review ten-point plan calls for the U.K. to work closely with the
international community regarding the long-term future of LIBOR and other
161
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global benchmarks, including the establishment of principles for other global
benchmarks, both those already in use and those that might be created in the
future.167 First, the authors of the review note that international regulatory
authorities should take up a discussion of the existing uses of rates such as
LIBOR and the role regulators should play in effecting a potential shift
toward an alternative benchmark.168 Second, the authors of the review
examine the role of the international community in developing a clear set of
principles to govern the regulation of all benchmarks.169
First, in looking at the role of international bodies in examining the
potential to transition from LIBOR to an alternative global rate, the authors
of the Wheatley Review recommend such a transition from LIBOR as
necessary only when an alternative benchmark might be a more appropriate
measure for setting the rate of a particular product.170 For example, if a
financial product does not depend on interbank liquidity and credit risk, then
LIBOR may be an inappropriate method for setting rates for that product
because those factors are the primary considerations on which LIBOR is
based.171 In these instances, the Wheatley Review believes that international
regulators, brought together by a group such as ISDA, might be able to
manage the risk posed for future contracts when the benchmark rate
Additionally, the Wheatley Review also believes that
changes.172
international regulators could encourage market participants to change their
use of global benchmarks by encouraging the use of the reference rate that
most fits the needs and requirements of a particular financial transaction,
rather than the most common rate.173 However, as a review sponsored by the
FSA—a U.K. regulatory entity—the Wheatley Review can offer little more
than encouragement.
Finally, the Wheatley Review notes the role the international community
can play in establishing “principles for effective global benchmarks.”174 The
Wheatley Review authors point to ongoing work that IOSCO and other
international entities are currently beginning to undertake. Particularly
interesting is the IOSCO Board-Level Task Force on Financial Market
167
168
169
170
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Benchmarks, established to look at benchmarks other than LIBOR and
chaired by Martin Wheatley, author of the Wheatley Review, and Gary
Gensler, Chairman of the CFTC.175 The purpose of the taskforce is to
identify benchmark rates, define the types of benchmarks relevant to
financial markets, propose regulatory and oversight policies for these
benchmarks, and develop global policy guidance and principles for the
benchmarks in government regulation and self-regulation.176 But, the
establishment of this committee raises questions of how these international
policy-setting efforts may result in actual enforcement of regulations,
particularly any focus that may be given to establishing such enforcement
mechanisms at an international level.
C. International Regulatory Responses: Fitting LIBOR into Current Models
for International Regulatory Response
Two of the most important bodies that provide international responses to
banking regulation issues are the Basel Committee and IOSCO.177
Examining how these bodies currently operate may provide some insight into
how the new regulatory responses to LIBOR can be implemented and
enforced at an international level. Both of these bodies currently operate
through a similar membership structure, issuing guidelines developed
cooperatively among members but implemented nationally by the regulatory
bodies that make up those memberships.178 However, the two bodies have
different missions and areas of coverage.179 While IOSCO governs the
regulation of the securities markets, such as how to trade securities, the Basel
Committee examines the regulation of banks themselves, looking at the
amount of liquidity a bank should have on hand.180 As LIBOR is primarily a
benchmark used in the setting of rates for securities transactions and IOSCO
is establishing the Task Force on Financial Market Benchmarks, IOSCO’s
model is most relevant to the international regulatory response discussed in
this Note.181
175
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Securities markets allow for the exchange of a variety of financial
instruments, many of which use LIBOR as a benchmark, including stocks,
treasury stocks, certificates of interest in profit-sharing agreements,
investment contracts, and more.182 Founded in 1983, IOSCO shifted from an
organization focused solely on the Americas to one focused on creating a
global body for the cooperative development of securities regulations.183
IOSCO has adopted a three-fold purpose:
1.
2.

3.

To cooperate in the development, implementation,
and promotion of international standards of regulation
and enforcement;
To enhance investor protection and confidence in the
securities markets by exchanging information about
and cooperating in the enforcement of misconduct as
it relates to the supervision of securities markets; and
To exchange information at a global level for the
purpose of strengthening markets and providing
appropriate regulation.184

As discussed previously, IOSCO is already working to provide regulatory
guidance around both LIBOR and global benchmarks generally by creating
the Task Force on Financial Market Benchmarks.185 The focus of this task
force is to develop policy guidelines for the regulation of global benchmarks,
including but not limited to LIBOR.186 The task force, in conjunction with
IOSCO more generally, will also develop recommendations for how
182
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countries should enforce regulatory policies within their own regulatory
structures.187
Enforcement of banking regulation is particularly important in the LIBOR
crisis, as the investigations into the conspiracy cross multiple national
boundaries.188 IOSCO first addressed this need for international cooperation
in enforcement in 2002, and again in 2012 when the members of IOSCO
drafted the “Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning
Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information” (IOSCO
MOU).189 This IOSCO MOU provided signatory countries with the right to
exchange information across national borders to assist one another in the
investigation of regulatory violations.190 The purpose of IOSCO was to
create a cooperative commitment to this type of information sharing and to
show a desire to engage in international enforcement of national regulatory
policy.191 The IOSCO MOU contains provisions that provide for the sharing
of both information about ongoing investigations and facts discovered in
bringing criminal charges, as well as ones not allowing national policy or
legislation barring the sharing of such information to hinder participation as
required by the MOU.192 To become a signatory to the IOSCO MOU, a
regulatory institution must show its ability to comply with the requirements,
although non-signatory countries could endorse and utilize the MOU’s
guidelines to inform their regulatory policies without making such a
showing.193 To prove such ability, the regulatory institutions must show that
the laws of their nation are in compliance with the general policy guidelines
set forth by IOSCO in regards to securities regulation.194 This additional
requirement not only promotes regulatory consistency but also provides
additional ammunition to ensure that information collected by signatory
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countries in investigations is useful to others.195 However, this tool did not
work in the case of LIBOR, primarily because the benchmark was
unregulated prior to the rate-setting conspiracy.196
As this task force moves forward, this author is interested to see how the
following questions get answered. First, will the recommendations provided
by the Wheatley Review will largely reflect the general guidelines developed
by this task force for global benchmarks more broadly? Second, will the task
force recommends replacing LIBOR altogether or will it develop a more
precise set of tools both broadening the number of global benchmarks and
the regulatory bodies governing them?
IV. CONCLUSION
The results of the LIBOR crisis and its impact on the international
regulatory environment are still unraveling. However, the recent global
banking and regulatory crises, such as the liquidity and credit crisis of 2008
and the LIBOR rate-setting scandal, raise an additional question about
whether the mechanisms currently in place sufficiently address the needs of
the international banking industry. While the Wheatley Review notes that its
purpose is only to deal with LIBOR regulation from a national perspective,
the review calls for international action on these issues. International action
would provide consistency across borders as well as provide clear
expectations to financial markets regarding ongoing regulatory decisions.
The need for the stability provided by international standards is even more
clear, given that LIBOR was recently sold to a U.S.-based company,
transferring regulatory responsibility to the U.S. Currently, without global
regulatory policy for benchmarks, no evidence exists to ensure that the
Wheatley Review recommendations currently being implemented will
continue upon the transfer of LIBOR to this new owner.
IOSCO currently appears to be the place where these issues will be
addressed, given the establishment of the committee to study global
benchmarks such as LIBOR. However, the depth and breadth of global
financial crises of recent years raises additional questions of whether purely
cooperative models such as IOSCO are sufficient to regulate the global
banking industry.
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Perhaps the banking industry should move away from a purely
cooperative model and look to a more binding model of regulatory
enforcement. A binding regulatory enforcement entity could not only
provide enforcement between state actors but also allow private actors to
hold banks and financial institutions responsible before an international
tribunal. The current lack of an international legal body to enforce such
public and private rights of action is particularly pertinent to LIBOR, given
the fact that no regulatory body had taken on an active role in overseeing
LIBOR. Arguably that misstep resulted in the failure to stop the conspiracy
early on.
The current IOSCO entity or the BASEL III could expand to include such
capacity similar to how the World Trade Organization writes a dispute
settlement system into its negotiated agreements.197 However, to encompass
such a shift in roles these existing bodies, particularly IOSCO, would need to
change their current models of gaining international cooperation, in several
key ways. First, IOSCO will need to begin monitoring new and current
global benchmarks and financial tools to ensure that these tools are under
regulatory purview. For example, if IOSCO was monitoring LIBOR’s
regulation, the body could have played a role in influencing the British
regulatory entities’ decision not to regulate LIBOR and curbed the crisis by
placing pressure on these entities to regulate the benchmark. Additionally,
IOSCO does not currently contain a dispute-resolution arm, and it would
either need to form one or to delegate dispute-resolution authority to another
body in order to create a forum for hearing such disputes. In this way, when
the LIBOR crisis comes to a head, the dispute resolution body could play a
role in determining state actor responsibility in failing to regulate.
A lack of regulation of financial tools and benchmarks was a key issue in
the explosion of the financial crises of recent years. From the subprime
mortgage market to LIBOR, the failure of state actors to properly regulate
financial instruments created a ripple effect in economies across the globe
costing both public and private actors billions of dollars in recent years. An
international approach is essential in preventing such future crises and
mitigating the current impacts of such crises. However, the current
mechanisms are insufficient to meet such demands. Over the next several
years, the financial industry will need to look to models in international trade
and human rights for examples of how to create a global approach to
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regulation that balances the need for flexibility with the need for
enforcement.

